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PGV Response to the Element I Executive Summary. 
Puna Geothermal Venture (PGV) agrees with the Element I Report conclusion that the 
geothermal resource encountered in the KS-8 well, although quite hot, is manageable 
through the use of modem well drilling and production technology. However, PGV 
does not agree that the KS-8 well uncontrolled flow event occurred because of 
inadequacies in PGV's drilling plan and procedures. PGV believes that it occurred 
because the drilling encountered a high temperature and high pressure geothermal 
resource at a depth that was more shallow than anticipated. PGV's previous 
experiences with the KS-7 well caused PGV to make significant changes to the 
drilling program implemented for KS-8, and the KS-8 well drilling program was 
prepared to handle any resource of similar characteristics (see PGV Response G). 
However, the temperatures and pressures of the geothermal resource encountered by 
the KS-8 well were substantially higher than those encountered in the KS-7 well. 
PGV concurs that there were a number of indicators preceding the KS-8 "kick" 
(defined by the Element I Report as "the intrusion of formation liquids or gas into a 
well bore which results in an increase in pit volume which, without corrective 
measures, can result in an uncontrolled flow from the well") and "uncontrolled flow 
event" (defined as "the uncontrolled flow of well fluids and/or well fluids from the 
well bore to the surface, or into lower-pressured subsurface zones") which could 
have led PGV to make certain decisions which would have substantially reduced the 
possibility that the KS-8 well kick would have turned into an uncontrolled flow event. 
However, there were also a significant number of additional indicators which led 
PGV to evaluate the situation differently. (See PGV Responses I and Z) . 
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However, PGV believes that all currently available information demonstrates that the 
kick, and subsequent uncontrolled flow event, of well KS-8 were not created by the 
condition, assumed by the Element I Report, of heavy drilling mud entering the 
fracture and thus leaving the well bore partially void of confining drilling fluid. 
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.. etcome these telailecty sladteoe htga ptessate gaeaetntM ttaetaiss:e See PGV 
Response J. 
In retrospect, PGV also agrees that the 9-5/8" casing should have been set somewhere 
near the 3, 177-foot depth. However, at the time the decision was made not to run the 
casing at 3,177 feet, numerous geologic indicators (see PGV Responses I and Z) did 
not show that PGV would encounter the type of geothermal resource that was, in fact, 
encountered. PGV was clearly recognizing, as the events were unfolding, the 
numerous conflicting indicators of the status of the geothermal well. These 
conflicting indicators did not, in PGV's evaluation, show the need for setting the 
casing at 3,177 feet. In addition, as stated in PGV Response I, this casing was not 
necessary to ensure proper anchoring of the blowout prevention equipment (BOPE), 
nor would setting any casing at any depth have prevented the kick. 
PGV disagrees with the Element I Report statement that sufficient cold water pumped 
down the well bore would certainly be able to completely kill the well during the 
uncontrolled flow event. uRalllu; PGV 'ul'r 11 lllal llu a si I a&:; Jdlit:g mad 
and'm G~:wem will bu ucusnqr fQ cowp'ut~:Ja· kill •b, ¥:S,i llf.al!. (see PGV 
Response J). 
PGV generally accepts the recommendations of the Element I Report. Please see 
PGV Responses P through Y and Attachment 1 for a discussion of the actions already 
taken, or planned to be taken, in response to these recommendations and the results of 
PGV's own internal investigation. However, PGV believes that none of the 
Element I Report findings or recommended equipment or procedural changes would 
have prevented the kick of well KS-8. 
A. Page 4, List of Persons Interviewed by Investigation Team. 
As a point of clarification, Norman J. Clark, Project Manager; William J. Teplow, 
Field Manager; and B. J. Livesay, Consultant, were never formally interviewed by 
the review panel regarding the KS-8 well uncontrolled flow event. Each of these 
individuals attended initial, informal group meetings with the review panel, but had 
no subsequent formal contact with the team. 
B. Page 5, paragraph 6; and page 6, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, regarding drilling permits. 
The Department of Health (DOH) issued an Underground Injection Control (UIC} 
Authority to Construct (ATC} permit for up to three (3) dedicated geothermal 
injection wells and up to nine (9) production/injection wells for the PGV project. 
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DOH does not normally issue UIC ATC permits for production wells, but may issue 
UIC A TC permits for wells which may be converted from production to injection. 
The information provided to the DOH with the application for the UIC ATC permit in 
June, 1989 consisted of two alternative designs for the injection wells: Alternative 1, 
an injection well design identical to the general production well design (with the 
addition of an internal hang-down liner); and Alternative 2, a dedicated injection well 
design. DOH does not request detailed information regarding the drilling proiram in 
its application forms for a UIC A TC permit, and such information was not submitted 
to the DOH by PGV. 
C. Page 6, paragraph 6, well KS-7 uncontrolled flow event. 
At the time of the KS-7 uncontrolled flow event, the annular preventer did not serve 
as the sole BOPE. The BOPE stack employed on the KS-7 well at the time of the 
event consisted of a rotating head, spacer spool, annular preventer, double ram 
preventer, mud cross, banjo box, and single ram preventer. 
D. Page 7, paragraph 2, regarding the status of the KS-8 well on June 7, 1991. 
Because the carbon dioxide response point in the mudloggers trailer was set at the 
background level of 330 ppm, PGV can only say that the carbon dioxide measured 
prior to this date was not greater than the background level of 330 ppm. 
E. Page 8, paragraph 3, quoting from the PGV report "Geothermal Well KS-8 
Uncontrolled Flow Event and Well Design Review". 
At the time of the June 12, 1991 meeting described in the Element I Report which led 
to the decision to continue drilling, PGV had certain information available to consider 
in making this decision. This included all of the information collected on the KS-3 
and KS-7 wells. Also considered was all available information on the current status 
of the KS-8 well, including the flow of drilling mud out of the wellbore, the gains in 
mud volume while pulling stands, and the gas entries while circulating "bottoms up". 
In addition, PGV was aware that there were no obvious mineralogic precursors of 
significant temperatures found in any of the cuttings, and that the mud temperature 
return history and the measured temperature profile curves for KS-8 much more 
closely resembled that of the cooler KS-3 well, rather than the hotter KS-7 well. This 
latter information indicated to PGV that temperatures in the KS-8 well were in the 
range of 450°F, rather than the 630°F subsequently encountered at a depth of 3,488 
feet. Moreover, the installation of the 9-5/8" casing was llQt necessary to assure a 
good anchor for the BOPE prior to further drilling (see PGV Response I). Based on 
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all this information, PGV made the decision to continue drilling deeper before setting 
the 9-5/8" casing, but to closely watch the selected indicators (listed in the referenced 
paragraph in the Element I Report) while drilling to specifically determine the point at 
which to set the casing. See PGV Response I for additional information. 
F. Page 10, paragraph 10, referring to the current status of well KS-8. 
Although surface pressures measured at the wellhead have been as low as 5 psi or 
lower since the well has been shut in, low wellhead pressures are temporary events. 
The much more typical wellhead pressure since shut in has been around 900 psi. 
PGV believes that this sustained high wellhead pressure, combined with the very high 
bottom hole pressures measured through the drill pipe after the shut-in, demonstrate 
that the KS-8 well has encountered a resource which is significantly above the 
pressure encountered in KS-7 or KS-3. 
G. Page 11, paragraphs 3 and 4, discussing the differences in the drilling program 
between KS-7 and KS-8. 
It is incorrect to state that the experiences of KS-7 did not result in a change to the 
drilling program used for KS-8. KS-7 was drilled using the" Alternative 2" well 
design contained in the DOH UIC permit application. KS-7 was drilled with a 17-1/2' 
hole with 13-3/8" casing down to 1,020'. A 12-'A'' hole was being drilled at the time 
of the kick in KS-7. 
Because of the elevated pressures encountered in KS-7, and the possibility that KS-8 
might be used as a production well, PGV elected to use the stronger "Alternative l" 
(production well) well design from the DOH UIC permit application. This design 
called for 20" casing cemented in 26" hole to approximately 1,000 feet; 13-3/8" 
casing cemented in 17-'h" hole to approximately 2,200 feet; and 9-5/8" casing 
cemented in 12-'-4" hole to approximately 4,000 feet. The "Alternative I" design for 
the KS-8 well was also improved by the use of higher strength casing in the upper 
portions of the hole. 
In addition, the drilling plan for the KS-8 well was modified so that the well would 
intersect, at a depth below 4,000 feet, the near-vertical fracture that KS-7 encountered 
at a depth of 1, 678 feet. This KS-8 point of intersection would occur after the 
cementing of the three (3) strings of casing described above. Based on the experience 
of KS-7, supplies of material to increase the weight of the drilling mud (barite) were 
stockpiled on site for the drilling of KS-8, and it was decided that the degree of 
mineralization in the drill cuttings was to be used to determine the casing set point. 
Coupled with an awareness of the potential for shallow fractures based on the 
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experiences from KS-7, these appeared to be all the major changes necessary for 
drilling the KS-8 well. 
H. Page 11, paragraph 6, discussing the reservoir conditions encountered by KS-8. 
PGV concurs that the temperature measurements taken on June 21, 1991 through the 
drill pipe in KS-8 indicate that the temperatures and pressures encountered in the 
fracture were far above those represented by a simple, normal hydrostatic situation, 
indicating that the KS-8 well encountered a relatively shallow geothermal resource 
which is significantly over-pressured relative to normal hydrostatic pressure at that 
depth. 
Please see Attachment 1 for a complete summary of the actions taken, or planned to 
be taken, to bring the KS-8 well into full control by PGV, consistent with the 
recommendations of the review panel and the conclusions of PGV's own internal 
investigation. 
I. Page II, paragraph 8, and page 12, paragraphs 1 and 2, regarding the "numerous 
'red flags'" and PGV's decision to drill to a depth of 4,000 feet. 
PGV does not agree that the factors enumerated in paragraph 8 of page 11 and 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of page 12 of the Element I Report can be taken in isolation as 
"red flags" or a "serious problem" that in themselves were sufficient to indicate the 
impending kick or uncontrolled flow event. As discussed below and in PGV 
Responses E and Z, PGV was aware of the enumerated information, but was also 
aware of significant information (such as measured temperatures and the lack of 
mineralization) which indicated that the KS-8 well was not acting like the KS-7 well. 
At that time, PGV believed that all prudent measures were being taken. 
In retrospect, PGV agrees that the 9-5/8" casing should have been set somewhere 
near the 3, 177-foot depth, as this would have isolated the fluids entering the well bore 
behind the casing. However, the decision to not run casing at 3,177 feet, but to 
continue to drill, was based on a number of factors which, at the time of the decision, 
did not indicate the necessity of setting casing at that time. See PGV Response E. 
There were no obvious mineralogic precursors of significant temperatures recognized 
in the cuttings, and the mud temperature return history and the measured temperature 
profile curves for the KS-8 well much more closely resembled that of the cooler KS-3 
well, rather than the hotter KS-7 well (indicating that temperatures were in the range 
of 450°F, rather than the 630°F subsequently encountered at a depth of 3,488 feet). 
Further, PGV did not believe that the small flow of geothermal fluid into the wellbore 
(as indicated by the flow of drilling mud at the surface) was a problem serious enough 
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to immediately require that the 9-5/8" casing be run. PGV was aware of the 
conditions encountered in the KS-3 and KS-7 wells, and believes that it was prepared 
to handle the consequences of drilling into the resource conditions found in the KS-3 
and KS-7 wells. However, the temperatures and pressures encountered in the KS-8 
resource were subsequently found to be substantially higher than those encountered in 
the KS-7 or KS-3 wells at a comparable depth. 
The installation of the 9-5/8" casing was not necessary to assure a good anchor for 
the BOPE prior to further drilling. In conformance with the then current drilling 
program and accepted geothermal drilling practices, the 9-5/8" casing was to be 
cemented in place, and the top of this casing was to be secured in an expansion spool, 
which would allow the casing to move up and down. The anchor for the BOPE while 
drilling below the 9-5/8' casing is still the 13-3/8" casing head with the 9-5/8" casing 
cemented inside of the 13-3/8" casing. 
J. Page 12, paragraphs 3 and 4, discussion regarding drill mud weight and cold water 
supply. 
PGV believes that sufficient information is now available to demonstrate that the 
geothermal resource encountered by the KS-8 well is different, although not unique, 
from the "typical" geothermal reservoirs experienced by the review panel. 
World-wide, other examples may be found in the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan and 
possibly other active volcanic terrains. The KS-8 reservoir contains geothermal fluid 
which is over-pressured relative to a column of water from the surface which is 
temperature equilibrated to the surrounding rock. Therefore, whether drilling with 
air, cold water or drilling mud, the geothermal fluid would rapidly and aggressively 
enter the well bore lillkn the cumulative weight of the column of drilling fluid 
exceeded that of the pressure of the reservoir. 
Geothermal well drilling is typically done with a column of drilling fluid (either liquid 
or air, or a combination of both) which, by design, either (i) allows some inflow of 
geothermal fluid into the well bore (known as "under-pressured" drilling, because the 
bottom-hole weight of the drilling fluid is "under", or less than, the pressure of the 
geothermal reservoir at the bottom of the hole; this system is used when drilling 
geothermal wells throughout The Geysers geothermal steam field), or (ii) prevents the 
geothermal fluid from entering the well bore (known as "over-pressured" drilling, 
which is used for most of the other geothermal areas in the world). Whether drilling 
under-pressured or over-pressured, encountering any geothermal resource at a higher 
pressure than the weight of the drilling fluid opposite the entry will immediately result 
in the commencement of flow of that geothermal resource into the well bore. The 
amount of fluid which enters the well bore and the rate at which it enters is dependent 
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upon the difference in pressures between the reservoir and the fluid in the well bore 
and the "productivity" (i.e., ability to produce fluid into the well bore) of the 
geothermal resource entry. 
Because typical geothermal reservoirs are at most only slightly over-pressured, the 
weight of the fluid in the well bore necessary to prevent backflowing of geothermal 
fluid from the reservoir into the well bore need not be much heaver than that of a 
column of water which is equilibrated at the temperature of the adjacent rock. 
Frequently, either cool or cold water (which is denser, and thus heavier, than the 
warmer water found in the geothermal reservoir) or a slightly weighted drilling mud 
is sufficient! y heavy at the bottom of the hole to prevent any back flow of geothermal 
fluid into the well bore. Only if the weight of the fluid in the drilling column is 
heavy enough to force back the geothermal resource into the reservoir and emptied 
part or all of the well bore, would a significant flow of geothermal resource come 
back into the well bore as a kick. Even under these circumstances, the wellhead 
pressures seen by the BOPE from a typical geothermal resource would be relatively 
low. 
The Element I Report assumes that the weight of the drilling mud used at the time of 
the kick, in excess of 10.6 pounds per gallon (ppg), contributed to the uncontrolled 
flow event because the drilling mud left the hole to enter the fracture, thus allowing 
the geothermal fluid to enter the well bore and escape to the surface. The Element I 
Report also assumes that kicks in geothermal wells such as experienced in KS-8 are 
usually controlled with the use of cold or cool water. PGV agrees that geothermal 
wells drilled into typical geothermal reservoirs (which are either under-pressured 
relative to hydrostatic (ground water) pressures (such as is the case for the entire 
Geysers geothermal steam field)), or are only slightly over-pressured relative to 
hydrostatic pressures (as is the case in most geothermal fields in California and 
Nevada), are usually controlled with the use of cold or cool water. However, the 
geothermal resource encountered by KS-8 is different from those typical geothermal 
resources mentioned in the Element I Report. 
As described above (see PGV Response E), the flowing bottom hole pressure of KS-8 
is approximately 1,950+ psi (at a depth of approximately 3,488 feet). However, the 
initial bottom hole pressure of KS-8 may have been as high as 2,200 psi. This means 
that any drilling fluid with a weight less than approximately 12.2 ppg would not have 
been able to control the initial pressure of the geothermal resource, and would have 
been immediately thrust back up the well bore, followed by the geothermal resource. 
This thrust of geothermal resource up the well bore constitutes the kick. The lighter 
the weight of the fluid in the drilling column, the easier the geothermal fluid would 
have thrust the drilling fluid back up the well bore. PGV believes that it is unlikely 
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that any amount of cold or cool water pumped down hole would have been able to 
prevent this geothermal fluid kick. Water is necessary to help cool and temporarily 
control the well during the current operations, but by itself probably cannot 
completely kill the well without also the use of heavy drilling mud and/or cement. 
See PGV Response T. 
K. Page 12, paragraph 6, item 1 of the Analysis of Blowout Equipment. 
The mud cooler provided by the contractor is designed to drop the mud temperatures 
by 10 to 15 °F. It was necessary to shut down the mud cooler for cleaning with each 
drill pipe connection at the time of the uncontrolled flow event only because the 
cooler was handling significant quantities of lost circulation material which was added 
to the drilling mud to plug off zones in the reservoir into which the drilling mud was 
leaking and which clogged the nozzles of the cooler. This limitation was recognized, 
and PGV was preparing to install the mud cooler of a different design from the other 
drilling rig when the kick occurred. 
L. Page 12, paragraph 8, discussions regarding indicators available to the driller. 
None of the actions undertaken by the driller resulted from information passed on to 
the driller from the mudlogger. The driller was watching the monitor in the doghouse 
when the kick occurred. Upon observing critical readings, he went over to the brake 
and started to pick up the Kelly so that he could close the BOPE. 
M. Page 13, paragraph 1, discussion regarding supply of cool, fresh water. 
As discussed above in PGV Response J, PGV believes that this geothermal resource 
can be cooled and controlled, but not completely "killed", by the use of large volumes 
of cool or cold water. Even if pumping large volumes of water down the well bore 
could control the well, PGV believes that the use of cool or cold water, rather than 
the available 100°F water, is unnecessary. The weight difference between a 
3,500-foot column of water of 75°F and a column of 100°F water is inconsequential 
(amounting to approximately 6 psi), and the difference in the heat absorption capacity 
(to the point of flashing) is only 2.6 percent. PGV has completed a second water well 
to increase the available supply of water. 
N. Page 13, paragraphs 2 and 3, discussions regarding size of the choke line. 
Because none of the permits issued by the regulatory agencies permitted venting of 
geothermal fluid, the choke line was neither sized to handle the flow of geothermal 
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fluid, nor was a silencer or muffler on the end of the choke manifold line at the time 
of the kick. 
0. Page 13, paragraph 4, discussion regarding supervisory personnel. 
Please see Attachment I for a discussion of the actions taken to strengthen the onsite 
management of the drilling rigs. 
P. Page 13, paragraph 5, Recommendations. 
PGV concurs that specific parameters for well design and possible modification during 
drilling must be made on a well-by-well basis, often as demanded by the subsurface 
conditions encountered during the drilling process. See also Attachment I for a 
discussion of the actions already taken, or planned to be taken, in response to these 
recommendations and the results of PGV's own internal investigation. 
Q. Page 13 and 14, Recommendations for Upper Portions of Well, Recommendations I 
and 2. 
PGV concurs that the philosophy expressed in Recommendation I regarding 
flexibility, and expressed in Recommendation 2 regarding implementing closer 
observations for temperature rise and/or hydrothermal alteration mineralogy, is 
correct and necessary. However, PGV believes it may be impractical, in real time, to 
follow Recommendation 2.b. Please see Attacthment I for a more complete 
description of PGV's monitoring program. 
R. Page 14, Recommendation I for equipment modifications and additional equipment. 
PGV agrees that a larger flow relief line from the BOPE stack is appropriate, and 
proposed this modification to the review panel during their investigations. However, 
it should be noted that should a kick occur, geothermal fluid would still be vented 
through this stack, although for only a short period of time. 
S. Page 14, Recommendation 2 for equipment modifications and additional equipment. 
Although it is not clearly indicated on the referenced Figure 8, PGV intends to install 
a "silencer" or muffler at the discharge end of the 13-3/8" flow relief line. In 
addition, PGV will install a hydrogen sulfide abatement system, similar to that used 
during the well flow tests, to abate hydrogen sulfide should the flow diverter line ever 
be used. 
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T. Page 14, Recommendations 3 and 4 for equipment modifications and additional 
equipment. 
PGV agrees with these recommendations, but believes that it is unlikely that any 
amount of cool water pumped down the well will be sufficient by itself to kill a well 
which encounters reservoir pressures such as those encountered in KS-8. Water is 
necessary to help cool and temporarily control the well during the current operations, 
but cannot completely kill the well without also the use of heavy drilling mud and/or 
cement. See PGV Response J. 
U. Page 14, Recommendation 5 for equipment modifications and additional equipment. 
PGV concurs with the recommendation that another mud cooler, less likely to clog, 
be added to the system. PGV has already acquired one such unit. However, PGV 
does not believe that the temperature of the drilling mud was, in any way, related to 
the kick or uncontrolled flow event. 
V. Page 15, Recommendation 6 for equipment modifications and additional equipment. 
PGV concurs that a Visulogger and pit rise alarm installed on the rig floor would 
assist the driller in timely reacting to any changes in the well status. Appropriate 
monitoring devices have been installed by PGV on the rig floor. 
W. Page 15, paragraph 2, discussing alternate BOPE stack arrangements. 
PGV concurs and, as noted in the above paragraph 2, had made these same 
recommendations to the review panel. 
X. Pages 15 and 16, Recommendations for State Regulatory Agencies. 
PGV concurs with the five recommendations made by the review panel for state 
regulatory agencies. PGV would point out, however, that neither the "National 
Geothermal Drilling Organization" (probably the Geothermal Drilling Organization or 
National Geothermal Association) nor the American Society for Testing of Materials 
are organizations set up to review current operations or establish procedural standards 
for drilling geothermal wells. As such, PGV believes that such a review is not 
appropriate. 
Y. Page 16, Recommendations for Supervisory Personnel. 
' . 
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PGV has reviewed these recommendations, and has altered its procedures to ensure 
that adequate supervision is available at all times. PGV is also undertaking additional 
training of PGV drilling personnel. See also Attachment l. 
Z. Page 16, Conclusion. 
PGV believes that it acted prudently and responsibly in its decision making process 
leading up to the kick and uncontrolled flow event of the KS-8 well, based on the 
information that was available to it at the time that these decisions were made (see 
PGV Response E). In retrospect, certain information might have been collectively 
interpreted differently, which could possibly have led PGV to case the well at the 
3,177 foot depth. This may then have prevented the kick from developing into an 
uncontrolled flow event. As discussed above in PGV Response J, PGV believes that, 
although the water would have helped to cool and control the KS-8 well, no amount 
of water of any temperature would have been able to fully kill the well. However, 
through implementation of the recommendations of the review panel and the 
additional improvements developed by PGV, PGV certainly concurs with the 
conclusion of the review panel that "drilling of geothermal wells in the Kilauea East 
Rift Zone may proceed safely." 
' . 
LIST OF ACTIONS TAKEN BY 
PUNA GEOTHPMAL WN'rURB (PGV) CONSISTENT 
WI'l'K TD RBCOMMENDATIONS OF 'l'HZ 
TECHNICAL INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS 
AND THE CONCLUSIONS OF PGV' S OWN 
INTERNAL INVESTIGATION 
The !ollowinq is a liat ot action• taken, or bequn, by PGV 
conaiatan~ with the recommendation• ot the Technical 
Invaatiqativa Reports ana the concluaione ot PGV's own internal 
invastiqation with respect to the June 12, 1991, ateam raleaaa. 
I. DRILLING PROCEDURES ANO SUPERVISION 
A. CASING PROGRAM 
'l'ha c•11nr: 11111111t ha ••~ !lO al.o•• l..u l..ha 1:op or the hiqh 
temperatura raaarvoir aa poaaibla without aettinq caainq in the 
hiqh temperatura reservoir. The method ot detarmininq the 
aettinq depth must remain tlexible and react to a aeries ot 
eattinq criteria. Mineralization ot cuttinqa muet be uaad in 
conjunction with other criteria. Temperature in axcaaa of 425• F 
may be one of the reliable indicator• for the top or the 
formation. Alae, increaaaa in c~ ana ~s in conjunction with 
t.mparature increaaea are indicators that tl:le wallbora ia cloaa 
to a prod.ucinq int~_ancl-th&~inq ahould ba run. 
T-parature aurV:~; in the term of ~imum reaciinq --ehar~~~ometara 
will be run at ~aterminad intervals tdmaaaura currant V.luaa of 7 bottom hole te~turaa~Whan appreachinq the reaour~ thea• 
will be run every 30 feat. \ ·- ________ _ _ _..~ rd-<,.. .J.., 1"'1 14 
B. MUD WEIGHT t~-< .-.., oz. ( ~, f,.., I o ,~J 
The Hawaii Dapa~ment ot Health Authority to conatruct (air 
quality) permit tor the PGV well field requirea that mud drillinq 
be utilized and the mud waiqnt be sutficiant to control pressures 
ot the reacurce. The mud wei;ht that ia required to control 
formation tluid preaaure• will vary with depth. Mua will D• 
weiqnted up if and ae required ~y the conditions o! the wall. 
C. SUPERVISION 
The chain of reaponaibility'"fQr the riq actiona cover the 
ait~ation durinq all operatiorts. The driller ia the tirat point 




Element I Reoort 
. ' 
To atrenqthan tha on-aita management of the riqe, the ~arkar 
Drilling co. (PDC) tool pushers are now workinq on a 12 hour 
rotation tor the currant critical operations on xs-a. Thia will 
be reinatitute4 whenever required. The puah•r and/or riq 
superviacr will De on tha riq floor durin~ all critical 
operations and during all craw chanqaa. Drilling auperviaion haa 
incraaaad to two people and will ~· achedulad on a rotation basia 
of either 12 or 24-hour duration. 
D. TRAINING EFFORTS 
Aa a part ot the normal traininq tor drillinq a geothermal wall, 
all personnel ware trained in ~s aataty. Also, wall control 
schools have bean held !or the drilling peracnnel. Theae achoola 
will be reputed aa necessary. . ... ·····. .. .....-<-h- r...._<; ... l,,.,{.k.c 
~~-- - ·"--,.+. \;> ,_ "-! ce. '7 
Aa a foundation !or traininq, tO'rJDal atandara drillinq orde~ are 
in preparation and will ba in pl~e prior to any tuture dri~linq. 
Theae atandard drillinq ardara will be the baaia for on-the-job 
traininq and for mora lite-apaci!ic formal training. 
A project-specific wall control school tailored for geothermal 
reaourcea will be prepared and all drillinq and key peraonnel 
will be trained aqain. Short aeminara will be usad to emphasize 
certain element• ot the operation where needed. The aaminara 
will be ~ailorad to the taaturea ot the resource and area. All 
on~•ita trainin~ will be loq~ed on the daily tour aneet. 
II. EQUIPMENT MOOIPICATIONS AND ADDITIONS 
A. MONITORING EQUIPMENT 
A radeaiqn or the monitorinq and communication ayatem now 
provides tor !natant contact ~etween the mud loq;er, the riq 
floor, the mud pita, tool pushers trailer and the PGV riq 
auperviaors trailer. The type and number ot contact stations haa 
been increased to ahorten tha diatanae to a raportinq atation. 
Additional alarm ayatams have been inatalled to 1ound pit laval 
variationa, ~s lavala and any othsr trend value that can be an 
indictor ot problema. A Viauloqqer-style drillers display haa 
be•n inatalled with monitor alarma which are controlled from the 
drillers station. Aa part ot the monitorinq chanqaa, a wiralin• 
••rvice with aqui~ment to work in the temperatures encountered 
will be employed. 
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B. WATER SUPPLY 
Additional water aupply tor wall control purpoaea haa bean 
provided by drillinq water wall MW-3. The wall and pump are 
daaiqnad to deliver 1,200 qpm continuoualy to the drillinq 
operation. The tlow ia piped directly to the area adjacent to 
Well Pad A and Wall Pad D. Raaarva pit atoraqa at eaCh wall pad 
will provide drillinq water and additional control tluida. By 
combininq the output trom wall MW-1, wall MW-3, on-aita atoraqa 
and mud ayatama, it ia now poaaibla to provide up to 2,100 qp~ 
water tor over 15 hours and 1,470 qpm water indefinitely tor well 
control. 
C. MUD SYSTEM 
1. MUD COOLER: A Kern steel Gao-cooler has been installed 
and is part ot the currant drillinq syatam. 
2. MUD PUMP CAPACITY: Additional mud pump capacity ia 
beinq auppliad by POC. The additional pumpinq capacity will be 
uaed in kill operation• on KS-a and be on amarqancy atandby. The 
two POC Riq 231 Continental-Emaco r-1000 pumpa provide adequate 
tlowrata and praaaura tor normal drillinq operation. 
3. DRILLING FLOID SYSTEM CAPACITY: Additional mud mixinq 
and atoraqe capacity haa bean installed or is in transit to the 
site. The additional equipment ia beinq supplied by PDC. 
The total uaabla capacity will be 4,27! bbls. Thera 
will be a larqa multiple of hole volume available aa aurtace 
storaqe tor mud, Oainq PGV·preaent practice aa to hole aize and 
caainq size, the hole volum~ ia 650 bDla. The aurtace atoraqe ot 
4,275 bbls would then qive a multiple ot over aix to one. Thia 
volume ratio will provide tor mud mixinq, movement and storaqe ot 
~ud pilla as required and provide a larqer volume tor 
conditioninq the mud on the tly durinq drillinq. Manifolding 
will be daaiqned and fabricated to facilitate mud movement. 
0. BLOW OUT PREVENTION SYSTEM 
1. The 13 5/8-inch SM BOP atack haa bean chanqed tor 
use in drilling the la l/4" hole and smaller. 
The lett column showa the exiatinq BOP ataek and 





13 5/8-inch 900 sari•• 13 5/8-inch 
DSA Flanqe 
900 Series to 1500 Series 
Single Gate BOP 
cameron sooo # 
Side outlet spool 
Double Gate BOP 
cameron Type v sooo I 





13 5/8-inch 1500 Series 
DSA Flanqe 
1500 Series 13 3/8-inch 
to 1!00 Series 13 5/8-
inch 
Dou):)le Gate BOP 
cameron Type v 5000 I 
Fabricated ):)anjo-):)ox 
with 13 5/B-inch side 
outlet 
Attached to aide outlet 
Cameron Sinqlea Gate BOP 
with 1!0 pei rupture disk 
cameron Type v 5000 I 
Dou):)le Gate BOP 
Annular BOP 5000 I 
spacer spool 
Rotating head 
A set ot varia):)le rams for uae in the upper dou):)le qat• is 
included in the equipment beinq brought to Hawaii. The variable 
ram will seal around any size or shape of pipe in ~he ram area 
and will close effectively around a hexagonal kelly. Tha annular 
praventar will also close around the kelly. 
2. The BOP stack that will be used in drillinq the 
17 1/2-ineh hole to the easinq point for the 13 3/8-inch haa been 
changed to the tollowinq: 
20" BOP STACK 
20-inch 3000 I well head 
20-inch CaMeron 2000 I dou):)le qate BOP 
20-inch Hydril Type MAP 21 1/4-inch 2000 I ann~lar. 
This atack arranqement will increaaa the ability to control 
unforeseen intrusions between the 13 3/8-ineh ana 20-inch casinq 
points. 
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J, A larqe 4iameter vent line ott the 13 5/8-inch 
5000 # atack will be inatalled. A weldneck tlanqe that will 
accommodate the 150 pai rupture 4isk will ce inatalled. The vent 
line will be anchored and a riqid support eyatem will ba hu11r 
:or th1~ 11"e- ~e •eli•C lii1e wi~! a!ao carry the exhaust point 
turthar trom the riq tloor to reduce interference with the 
activitiea on the riq floor when takinq a kick. A noise muttler 
and ~s acatement eyatem will be attixed to the terminal and ot 
the vent line. 
The PDC R1q <31 as presently contiqured haa six atations on the 
Koomey SOP! control unit. The new SOP stack will require seven 
stations and a spare, tor a total ct eiqht stations. The 
addition ot two Koomey atations may require extra accumulator 
capacity. The a441tional two stations will be added, and it 
needed, additional accumulator capacity will be ad4ed to the 
ayatem. 
4. In the choke manifold, One hydraulically 
controlled remote operator 1• installed on the bypass line in the 
choke systam. This 1• in parallel to the 13 3/8-inch bypaaa line 
diacusaed as part ot the atack. Tne choke bodies will be moved 
further trom the riq tloor and will have ailancers affixed to the 
end aeotiona. 
!. W!LL HEAD DESIGN CHANGES 
The 13 3/8-inCh caainq i• the toun4ation ot the preventer system 
a1 well as the production or injection wellhead. The 9 5/8-inch 
caainq ia auapen~ed throuqb the ~3 3/8-inch by 9 S/8-incb 
expanaion apool an4 cemented insida the 13 3/8-inch caainq. 
The deaiqn ot the KS-8 wellhead oriqinally waa to be 13 3/8-inch 
wellhead, 13 3/8•ineh by 9 5/8-inch expansion apool, 10-inch 
master valve and 10-inch wellhea4 valva, and than the pipinq 
ayatem to the powerplant. All ot thia oriqinal deaiqn was 900 
Sari•• 13 3/8-inch wellhead equipment. 
It ia anticipated that the wells will be produced choked. Thia 
will cauae the wellhead operatinq temperature to be hi9her than 
oriqinally expected, Therefore, the 1500 series wellhead 
aaaembliea will be ~••d on pro~uction walla. 
The wellhead desiqn tor KS-8 will be all 1500 seriaa equipment. 
Attar well control is accompliahed on KS-8 and casinq has been 
run, the 13 3/8-inch 900 Seriae well head will be removed and a 
13 3/8-inch 1500 Sari•• wellhead will be welded on to the 13 3/8-
inch caainq. The other components tor the stack will be 1500 
Sari••· All ot thia aquipment ia onaite. 
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The 1500 S«riea aaaeabl1ea will be ueea tor each production well 
unle•• and until it ia determined that 900 seriee will be 
autticient tor the preeaure and temperature encountered. 
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